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IN BRIEF
The protection of civilians and their property in war is an accepted norm of international law
- even where the putatively {{noncombatant" populace openly supports the immoral use of
force by its military. NATO's Kosovo operation suggests, however, that the imposition of
hardship on the sentient, adult {{noncombatant" population through property loss can erode a
society's appetite for malevolence. While civilians should not be targeted, a new paradigm for
noncombatancy that allows the destruction of certain property currently protected by
international law but not absolutely indispensable to civilian survival may well help shorten
conflict and effect necessary societal change.
f recent press reports about the Kosovo
air campaign in the spring of 1999 are to
be believed, the Milosevic regime yielded
not because its fielded forces were defeated,
but because of the impact of the bombing on the
Serb people. 1 According to reports, the air
strikes gradually reduced many Yugoslav civilians to "caveman" status. 2 The record shows
the progressive imposition of that condition
coincided precisely with the sought-after breakdown of Serb resistance. Yet such bombings
are troubling to some. 3 Ifthey were aimed primarily at adversely affecting noncombatants
(as opposed to diminishing actual military
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1. See e.g., John Barry and Evan Thomas, The Kosovo
Couer-up, Newsweek, May 15, 2000, pp. 22, 24. (''Air power
was effective in the Kosovo war not against military targets but against civilian ones .... Making the Serb populace
suffer ... threatened [Milosovic's] hold.")
2. Just days before the Serbs yielded to NATO, former
President Jimmy Carter complained that "Serbian citi-
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capability), they seem at odds with the common understanding of legal and ethical warmaking that seeks to spare civilians the effects
of the use of force. A new paradigm for noncombatancy may be in order for the postKosovo era.
Noncombatants and Moral Innocence
A conceptual anomaly arises from the fact
that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is
much more generous in the protections it
affords civilians than many nonspecialists
intuitively consider appropriate. Today LOAC
zens report they are living like cavemen, and their torment increases daily." Jimmy Carter, "Have We Forgotten
The Path To Peace?," New York Times, May 27,1999. This
news item and others for this article, see Department of
Defense, Current News Early Bird, at http://ebird.dtic.mil.
3. See Charles Truehart, "War Crimes Court Looking at
NATO," Washington Post, December 29, 1999, p. A20.
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does not, for example, attempt to determine
moral culpability when assigning noncombatant status. Indeed, many of those protected
as "noncombatants" by international law as it
has evolved over the years have unmistakable
moral responsibility. In War & Law Since 1945
Geoffrey Best notes that the "idea of the noncombatant shifted" over the years. Where once
the law sought to protect "a person who formed
no part of an enemy country's armed strength
and made no contribution to it," it now extends
coverage to all those not formally part of a military organization. He further observes that
"this legal development is not without moral
and political difficulties. It has produced rules
of law which may not correspond with the
moral and political realities of societies in
armed conflict."4
Best's concerns about moral accountability
as it relates to LOACis especially well-founded
in cases where force is required to deal with
societies psychologically disposed to champion
ethnic cleansing and similarly maniacal behavior by their militaries. Furthermore, unlike
the situation existing when noncombatant status originated, civilians in developed societies
do, as Best might put it, very often "contribute"
to the country's armed strength in ways not
extant just a few decades ago. The growing
dependence of today's militaries on civilian
systems necessary to support high-technology
war makes this SO,5 as does the fact that in
modern - and relatively modern - nations,
the need for popular support in order to project
force is an accepted fact of political life.
Americans find ascribing culpability to the
enemy citizenry disconcerting. The reflexive
desire to absolve the supporting populace resonates in the mantra of u.s. politicians of
recent years: "America's fight is not with the
_ people, it is with their leader." Regrettably,
this thesis is often flawed, and was plainly
wrong as applied to Slobodan Milosevic and
his countrymen. In an insightful essay in the
New York Times, Anthony Lewis wrote:
4. Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994; paperback ed. 1997), pp. 258-259.
5. See Michael N. Schmitt, "Bellum Americanum: The
U.S. View of Twenty-first Century War and Its Possible
Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict," Michigan
Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No.4., p. 1068-69.
6. Anthony Lewis, "The Question of Evil," New York
Times, June 22, 1999.
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Slobodan Milosevic is not the only author
of the war crimes in Kosovo. Thousands of
Serbs were involved. And hundreds of thousands more back in Serbia proper were fixed
in the belief that the Serbs had done no
wrong. They were subjected to Milosevic
propaganda, yes. But even when told of Serb
atrocities in Kosovo, they argued that the
Serbs were only replying - they were the
real victims. 6
In such cases ''America's fight" - contrary to
the politician's paean - is, in fact, with the
"people" in those societies that countenance
and support murderous conduct. Samuel
Huntington, in his perceptive book, The Clash
of Civilizations, predicted the U.S. may well
find itself in contests with civilizations that
do not share its values. 7 That Americans find
this so inexplicable is partly the result of cultural arrogance - the idea that whole societies could reject the U.S. Weltanschauung is
foreign to the American psyche - and partly
out of an almost inexplicably innocent naivete.
Daniel Boorstin tells us Americans suffer from
"Myths of Popular Innocence" - the illusion
that adversary populations are helpless victims of cruel leaders. 8 In truth, this is seldom
the case even when the leaders are, indeed,
ruthless autocrats. Boorstin points out that
despite the existence of a powerful military
backed by an extensive internal security apparatus, the Soviet empire collapsed with nary a
shot fired once the popular will evinced an
unmistakable desire for change.
In short, Americans like to believe others
think much as they do and that the whole
world aspires to their same values. The sad
fact is that this just is not true. In Kosovo, the
unpleasant reality is that many Serbs were
willing supporters of Milosevic's policies, if not
of the man himself.9 True, Serb propaganda
provoked ethnic hatred, and this may have
explained the attitudes of rural and uneducated Yugoslavs. But that does not explain 7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and
The Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon &
Shuster, 1996).
8. Daniel J. Boorstin, "Myths of Popular Innocence," US.
News & World Report, March 4, 1991, p. 41.
9. See e.g., Eve-Ann Prentice, "Serbs Unmoved By
Kosovans' Anguish," London Times, May 26, 1999.
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as the Wall Street Journal notes, the behavior of "the Serbian intelligentsia - the university professors, journalists, potentates of
the Orthodox Church and other cognoscenti
who knew better but kept silent ...."10

Influencing Mass Psychology
Thoughtful military strategists readily
appreciate that successfully influencing the
psychology of the masses can clear a path to
victory. War is not - as many Americans and
others are wont to believe - merely a process
of destroying an enemy's military artifacts. In
war properly conceived, the real battlefield is
the human mind. The great military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz taught that war is an act
intended "to compel our enemy to do our will."
Clausewitz further maintained that the people,
the government, and the military formed a
. "remarkable trinity" essential to waging war.ll
Disassembling that trinity has been a goal of
Clausewitzeans for generations because it .
results in the collapse of an opponent's ability to continue to fight.
Airpower thinkers - beginning with Giulio
Douhet in his classic Command of the Air have long sought to use the air weapon to do
the dismembering. 12 Warplanes can strike
directly at an enemy's heart by overflying his
military forces and attacking his homeland in
order to sever the people from their government and military. To some, however, the
resiliency of the German population during
World War II air bombardments, as well as
that of the Japanese people, disproved the
theories of Douhet and his adherents.
This criticism is valid only to the degree to
which it is qualified by several facts.
Specifically, the conventional munitions of
World War II were not as potent as Douhet's
theory required; the ability of totalitarian
regimes of the 1940s to persevere in the face of
air attack was greater than Douhet's concept
foresaw; and air defenses proved to be much
10. "Deconstructing Serbia," The Wall Street Journal
Europe, June 22, 1999. See also Mark J. Osiel, Obeying
Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline & the Law of War
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 66.
("Most Serbian officers, and even many Serbian enlisted
personnel, had good reason to know that the war their
superiors ordered them to wage was aggressive in nature.")
11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, ed., and trans. 1976) (1832), p. 75. Clausewitz
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more capable vis-a.-vis the era's bombers than
Douhet anticipated. But Douhet was ahead of
his time. Among other things, he expected the
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)poison gas in specific - in air attacks against
urban populations in order to break the people's
will. 13 Japan's collapse after the destruction of
just two of its cities by air-delivered WMD is
more indicative of the validity of Douhet's
theories than any other comparison.

The air weapon should be unleashed
against entirely new categories of
property that current conceptions of
Law of Armed Conflict put off-limits.
Most importantly - and this is critical to
the future use of the air weapon - until
Kosovo Douhet's theories were never tested
using to day's enormously destructive and ingeniously targetable conventional munitions,
and never against the psychology of a modernizing, acquisitive, semi-cosmopolitan society dressed in quasi-democratic institutions
and processes. This was much the situation,
however, that American military officers found
in Serbia at the start of the campaign. If the
consequences of war could be brought to the
Yugoslav public, the Serbs themselves would
pressure Milosevic to yield or remove him
entirely.14 The difficulty was that existing LOAC
rules - not to mention ethical constraints prohibited directly targeting noncombatants
and noncombatant objects.
The indirect effects of orthodox attacks on
dual-use infrastructure (that is, infrastructure used by both civilians and military forces)
could, however, have the desired impact.
Targeting infrastructure is consistent with
LOAC so long as the direct and concrete military advantage sought outweighs expected
collateral losses to noncombatants and their
held that war is a "remarkable trinity" composed ofthe
people, the military, and the government, p. 89.
12. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York:
Coward-McCann, 1942; reprinted Washington, DC: Office
of Air Force History, 1983).
13. Ibid., p. 58.
14. See e.g., Rowan Scarborough, "Civilian Deaths Must
Be Expected, NATO Says," Washington Times, June 2,
1999, p. 1.
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property. Even with those
refrigerators weren't
limitations, the indirect
running,
there was no
We must not hesitate
water in their kitchens
effect of the bombing on the
to demonize the demons.
or bathrooms, no lights,
psychology of the civilian
no transportation syspopulation seemed well
tem to get to work, and
understood. Consider the
assault on Serbia's power grid. The Washington
five or six military headquarters in Belgrade
had disappeared, they would have asked:
Post reported on May 25, 1999 that although
'All this after the first night? What is the
NATO officially insisted that attacks on the
rest ofthis [conflict] going to be like?' "17
power grid were intended to disrupt the
Yugoslav military, "senior allied military officials acknowledged that they also wanted to
Although the actual attacks conducted
against Serbia's infrastructure appear justidamage the quality of everyday life so that
fied as bona fide efforts to reduce the effecsuffering citizens will start questioning the
intransigence of their politicalleadership."15
tiveness of military facilities and military
equipment/communications,18 the commanIt appears this strategy worked, as Thomas
der's hypothetical in Airman about infraL. Friedman related in the New York Times:
structure attacks does illustrate the compliAs the Pentagon will tell you, airpower alone
cations of LOAC. Destroying infrastructure in
brought this war to a close in 78 days for
order to deny noncombatants an indispensable necessity of life like drinking water, to
one reason - not because NATO made life
impossible for Serb troops in Kosovo (look
make their bathrooms and sewage systems
how much armor they drove out of there),
waterless and unworkable, to leave them in
wartime without refrigeration for their food,
but because NATO made life miserable for
the Serb civilians in Belgrade. 16
and to deny them transportation without
regard to the nature of their work, is not the
Following the conflict, Airman magazine,
kind of attack LOAC ordinarily allows. 19 In
an official publication of the U.S. Air Force,
other words, attacks for the sole purpose of
published the following comments by the senior
eroding noncombatant life support systems
Air Force commander during the campaign:
are prohibited. This is not to say, however,
that noncombatants cannot be inconvenienced
''As an airman, I would have targeted the
or denied luxuries or, for that matter, have
power grid, bridges and military headtheir political will be made a target. But doing
quarters in and around Belgrade the first
so, as Yves Sandoz of the International
day ofthe conflict," said [the commander],
Committee of the Red Cross observes, is difwho believes that's what eventually brought
ficult under today's legal regime because
defining the "military advantage when the
Milosevic to his knees. ''Air power is made for
aim of the operation is to weaken the enemy
shock value."
so as to make him surrender" is quite prob"Just think if after the first day, the
Serbian people had awakened and their
lematic. 20
15. Phillip Bennett and Steve ColI, "NATO Warplanes
Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid," Washington Post, May 25,
1999, p. 1.
16. Thomas L. Friedman, "Was Kosovo World War III?,"
New York Times, July 2, 1999.
17. As quoted by MSgt Tim Barela in "To Win a War,"
Airman, September 1999, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added).
These are essentially the same points reported earlier
by the Washington Post. See William Drozdiak, '~r War
Commander Says Kosovo Victory Near" Washington Post,
May 24,1999, p. 1.
18. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff insists that
"[e]very target struck was a military-related target .... "
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General Hugh H. Shelton, "Kosovo: Joint Chiefs
Chairman Disagrees," Christian Science Monitor, July
12, 1999. See also, Michael Ignatieff, "The Virtual
Commander," The New Yorker, August 2, 1999, pp. 31,
35.
19. Article 54, 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, makes it prohibited "to attack, destroy,
remove or render useless objects indispensable for the
survival of the civilian population" for "any motive."
20. Yves Sandoz, "Beware, The Geneva Conventions Are
Under Fire," International Herald Tribune, July 14,1999.
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While the various rationales for avoiding
dual-use infrastructure attacks are usually
readily understandable, the reasoning against
striking other kinds of civilian objects is rather
less clear. Under the current Law of Armed
Conflict, a civilian object exempt from attack
is everything that is not a "military objective." Military objectives "are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture and neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage."21 Under these
limitations, personal property is a category
of civilian "objects" seldom subject to legitimate attack. This rule can create curious situations.
During the Kosovo campaign the press
reported an alleged plan for a computer-based
strike on Milosevic's personal bank accounts. 22
Later stories indicated that legal concerns
were one reason the cyberassault was
aborted. 23 If such a plan existed, the legal
issues might include the fact that absent a
showing, for example, that the monies are
being used to directly support a military
effort, LOAC would not permit raiding
Milosevic's personal accounts. To many the
prohibitions against such attacks - especially where "bloodless" cyberwar techniques
are used - are nonsensical. Cyberwar expert
Don Stauffer, noting the unintended consequences on civilians of bombing campaigns
aimed at traditional targets, makes the
obvious point: "Surely hurting a civilian's
pocketbook is more ethical than bombing
him."24 This observation is particularly apt
as civilian leaders who serve as commanders
in chief of their armed forces --'-- like Milosevic
- are legitimate targets themselves, although
- paradoxically - their personal property
is not.
21. The general protection of civilian objects was codified in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, chapter III. While the U.S. has not ratified Additional Protocol I, this portion is considered part
of customary international law.
22. See e.g., Gregory L. Vistica, "Cyberwar and Sabotage,"
Newsweek, May 31, 1999, p. 38.
23. See William Arkin, "Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia,"
Washington Post (Electronic Edition), October 25, 1999,
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Toward a New Paradigm
Should LOAC continue to bar the deliberate destruction of civilian property? Should
the bar apply even when the destruction is
aimed at eroding a society's appetite to do the
unconscionable against the helpless? In an
intriguing new book, The Soul of Battle, classics professor Victor Davis Hanson suggests
modern democracies should "rethink what constitutes real brutality in war and who are the
real peace-makers."25 In coming to this conclusion Hanson examines three great campaigns against tyrannical "cultures of slavery": Epaminodas' destruction of Spartan militarism, William Tecumseh Sherman's
bludgeoning of the heart of the Confederacy,
and George Patton's race into Germany that
smashed Nazism. Hanson points out that after
"the terrible marches of retribution into their
country, none of these cultures of slavery would
field a credible army again."26

When societies propagate evil,
democracies must be prepared to visit
upon them force so staggering it will
produce fundamental change.

Professor Hanson sees these three campaigns in stark terms of virtuous crusades of
democratic armies against morally flawed societies. The genius of these operations, Hanson
contends, is that the democratic warriors swept
into hostile territory to destroy the spirit rather
than the bodies of their enemy. Although the
property damage inflicted upon the enemy's
territory in each case was immense, there were
relatively few casualties on either side. Hanson
insists a "democratic nation in arms must
at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationalldotmill
arkin.htm, and Bradley Graham, "Military Grappling
With Rules For Cyber Warfare," Washington Post,
November 8,1999, p. 1.
24. Don Stauffer, "Electronic Warfare: Battles Without
Bloodshed," The Futurist, January-February 2000, p. 26.
25. Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of Battle: From Ancient
Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators
Vanquished Tyranny (New York: The Free Press, 1999),
p.405.
26. Hanson, p. 406.
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make the entire society of the enemy pay for
the aggression of its army [and] must convince
his own democratic army that they are morally
superior to the enemy."27 He argues the lesson
for democratic societies today is that, in the
end, there "must be a choice between good and
evil, that the real immorality is not the use of
great force to inflict punishment, but ... the failure to exercise moral authority at all."28
Hanson's thesis may suggest a strategy for
the use of force in the future. Specifically, when
facing a society whose moral compass is wildly
askew, it may well behoove democracies to consider a similarly sweeping campaign against
property - despite its terrible destructiveness. In other words, use ruinous force not
upon people (to even include combatants if
possible), but upon objects. Although Hanson
envisions a physical invasion of an enemy's
territory as necessary to induce a cultural
change on an amoral enemy, there may well
be application to the air weapon, if its full
potential is realized.
We need a new paradigm when using force
against societies with malevolent propensities. We must hold at risk the very way oflife
that sustains their depredations, and we must
threaten to destroy the world as they know it
if they persist. This means the air weapon
should be unleashed against entirely new categories of property that current conceptions
of LOAC put off-limits. As the Kosovo campaign demonstrates, striking from the air is
today the safest and most effective way for the
U.S. to use force because it exploits the asymmetric warfighting advantage it enjoys over
every military in the world. American air power
today is virtually unstoppable. Furthermore,
technologies now available to U.S. airmen allow
tremendous destructive power to be applied
discretely and efficiently against a wide range
of objects that opportunistic, materialistic societies like Yugoslavia value.
What kind of civilian objects would be added
to target lists? None that are genuinely indispensable to the survival of the noncombatant
population. Not struck, for example, would be
many of the infrastructure targets suggested
in the Airman magazine article. However,
almost everything else of any value would be
fair game. The new target sets would include

such things as banks and financial institutions. Factories, plants, stores, and shops that
produce, sell, or distribute luxury products or,
indeed, anything not absolutely indispensable
to noncombatant survival, might be wonderfully rewarding targets - as could be their
associated logistics systems. Reducing the
middle and upper classes to a subsistence level
through the destruction of access to all but
essential goods might pressure the very groups
best positioned to effect the desired change.
Additional targets under this proposal could
include selected cultural, educational, and historical sites whose existence provides support
- to include psychological sustenance - to
the malignant ideology that stimulates the
behavior the use of force is intended to stop.
Furthermore, resorts, along with other entertainment, sports, and recreational facilities
could be slated for destruction. Of course, government offices and buildings of every kind
would be subject to eradication, even if they
do not directly support military activities
(except those whose destruction would seriously impede the delivery of services indispensable for noncombatant survival). Finally,
to the extent it is feasible to do so, the personal property of the sentient, adult population ought to be held at risk so long as it is
not, again, indispensable to human survival.
Milosevic's bank accounts would be high on
the target list under the revised model.
This proposal openly acknowledges an intent
to inflict hardship upon the sentient, adult,
(albeit putatively noncombatant) populace who
must be held responsible for the deeds of their
military forces. It includes even those who may
oppose their government's policies. Given the
tremendous scale of atrocities that are infecting the modern world, not to mention the globalization of WMD technology, ethical norms
should place an affirmative duty on a nation's
citizenry to actively frustrate their government's actions when they become patently
inhumane. James W. Child points out "people
have a duty to restrain their government from
committing nuclear aggression and if they fail
in that duty, their absolute immunity as noncombatants is undermined."29 Much the same
can be said when abuses on the scale of a
Kosovo occur, at least insofar as the immunity

27. Hanson, p. 33.
28. Hanson, p. 412.

29. James W Child, Nuclear War: The Moral Dimension
(Somerset, NJ: Transaction, 1986), pp. 171-172.
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currently enjoyed by civilian objects is concerned. If enemy publics fail to restrain their
governments - notwithstanding it may require
them to place their moral responsibility above
their personal safety - then they must forfeit their claim to the quality of life civilian
objects provide.
Nevertheless, the proposal recognizes that
the wholesale destruction of civilian property
not necessary for human survival may still
unintentionally impose distress upon those
truly innocent such as children, the infirm,
and the insane. Realistically, this unfortunate
predicament cannot be completely avoided,
but efforts must be made to minimize it.
Accordingly, in order to lessen unintended consequences, certain limits need to be put in place:
a) The attacks should only be conducted in
those circumstances where the intended effect
of undermining the will of the people appears
to have a reasonable likelihood of success. Not
all societies are necessarily vulnerable to a
strategy that destroys objects as opposed to
people. Particular adversaries may be indifferent to property loss, or have nothing of value
to destroy.
b) The attacks must not be for the purpose,
per se, of punishment for punishment's sake,
but rather for the purpose of eviscerating the
disposition of the adversary to conduct objectionable activities.
c) The attacks should be preceded by clear
warnings, if possible, and be accompanied by
an extremely aggressive information campaign
that unambiguously sets forth the rationale
for the attacks, as well as the actions needed to
terminate them.
d) Civilian safe areas and evacuation routes
should be designated whenever possible, and
medical or religious facilities must not be targeted unless they are actually being used for
military purposes. Steps must also be taken
to provide subsistence for enemy noncombatants when necessary.
e) The scope and severity of the attacks must
bear a reasonable relationship to the egre30. By May 25, 1999, CNN was reporting that 82% of
Americans favored a suspension of the airstrikes. See
Keating Holland, "Americans Want Temporary Halt to
Airstrikes," May 25,1999, at http://cnn.comlALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/05/25/poll!. In the same poll, the percentage of Americans favoring U.S. participation in the
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giousness of the conduct sought to be prevented, and the level of force necessary to
purge the enemy society of its perverse beliefs.

Under the current Law of Armed
Conflict, a civilian object exempt from
attack is everything that is not a
"military objective."
This proposal does not endorse infrastructure
attacks intended solely to deny the civilian
population water, power, and other indispensable necessities of life because, in addition to ethical and legal concerns, such strikes
can be militarily counter-productive. Whatever
tolerance the American public may have for
the destruction of property, it does not appear
to extend to acts that kill noncombatants, even
unintentionally. In this regard it is instructive to note that mounting reports of civilian
casualties during the Yugoslav conflict paralleled a progressive drop in public support for
the air campaign.30 From a frankly Machiavellian perspective, scenes of enemy noncombatants dying from the effects of infrastructure
loss would undermine the ability of a democracy to make war.
Additionally, the proposal must not be confused with the kind of indiscriminate bombing campaign the Russians are reported to
have conducted in Chechnya. There, objects
indispensable to noncombatant survival apparently were destroyed, and many civilians
trapped in battle areas were killed. Nor should
it be confused with "bomb them back to the
Stone Age" efforts apocryphally attributed to
Vietnam-era strategies. Both approaches violate the proposal's central principle that calls
for discrimination between objects that are
indispensable to noncombatants, and property
superfluous to human survival. Furthermore,
as already suggested, imposing massive property loss will only have a positive effect on
airstrikesfell from 61% on 15 April to 49%. For details
of the earlier poll see Keating Holland, "Support for
NATO strikes, and ground troops growing," April 15,
1999, at http://cnn.comlALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/
04/15ikosovo. poll!.
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bello ordinarily makes no judgments as to the
moral rectitude of any belligerent. Proponents
of this concept maintain that if the rule were
that the morally
"wrong" side was
Conclusion
The new target sets would include
unworthy of the
protection of LOAC,
It is, of course, trousuch things as banks and financial
then all war would
bling to anyone coninstitutions. Factories, plants, stores,
quickly escalate
cerned with the ethiwithout constraints
cal conduct of war to
and shops that produce, sell, or
as
each party
acquiesce to what
distribute
luxury
products
or,
indeed,
believes
it and it
seems to be a retreat
alone
has
the
moral
from a carefully conanything not absolutely indispensable
high
ground.
structed legal archito noncombatant survival, might be
Regrettably, the
tecture aimed at
diminishing war's horlogic
behind jus in
wonderfully rewarding targets.
bello simply has not
ror. Nevertheless, evosufficed in practice.
lutions in accepted
norms do occur in
Even the most
LOAC from time to time, as they do in other
ardent zealots of LOAC admit its rules are
areas of international law. From a moral peroften unknown or, if known, ignored. 31 A cursory
review of the savage conflicts of the last twenty
spective a change that seeks to replace the
killing of people with the destruction of objects
years in the Balkans, Sudan, Lebanon, Sierra
Leone, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere
would seem to represent a positive step toward
reducing human suffering in armed conflicts.
proves that lamentable point.
Some will contend the massive destruction
Most ominous, however, is the potential that
of property will simply create deep-seated bitsome future adversaries may deliberately abanterness that will plant the seeds of future condon LOAC adherence altogether - based on
flict. Despite a certain logic of the contention,
their notion of righteousness. In a recent book,
experience demonstrates a fearful truth: that
two Chinese officers proposed a policy of "unresuch will only occur if the destruction is inapstricted war" for their nation. They complained
propriately tempered. Consider that the mas"We are a weak country ... so do we need to
sive destruction of Germany and Japan during
fight according to your rules? No. War has
World War II allowed the necessary physical
rules, but those rules are set by the West ....
and psychological reconstruction to begin
But if you use those rules, then weak councleanly from "bare metal" with the help of the
tries have no chance."32 Confronting an enemy
U.S. and others. Importantly, the devastation
disposed to use force wholly unrestricted by
inflicted - much of it upon irreplaceable objects
legal boundaries may someday present a harsh
dilemma for the U.S. and other Western coun- did not result in embittered societies biding time to wreak revenge. To the contrary,
tries: suffer brutal losses - or even defeat the millennium-old militaristic instincts of
or lash out in kind. The reality is that neither
both a great Asian power and its European
result is acceptable. What we must do is fashcounterpart were uprooted in little more than
ion new rules now that - at a minimuma generation to be replaced by near pacifism.
honor the value of human life over property
The hideous fascisim of both cultures is now
interests. Trying to do so in the midst of a
only an embarrassing memory.
future conflict would be gravely ill-conceivedIt is fair to say that aiming to destroy nonit must be accomplished in the reasoned atmoscombatant property as discussed above repphere of peace, prosperity, and power.
resents a significant departure from a basic
A new paradigm that plainly declares the
premise of LOAC, that is, the idea that jus in
perpetrators of violent, misogynic policies will

accumulative, wealth-oriented nations with
assets to lose, and those societies accustomed
to - or desirous of - the benefits of modernity.

31. See e.g., Juanita Darling, "Study Finds Geneva
Convention Little Known, Seldom Obeyed," Los Angeles
Times, November 5,1999.
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32. As quoted in John Pomfret, "China Ponders New
Rules of 'Unrestricted War'," Washington Post, August
8,1999, p. AI.
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face a response so ferocious it will leave their
nation physically and psychologically unrecognizable, just might dampen the urges of
even the most recalcitrant of peoples.
Promulgating such a paradigm will be no easy
task. Today, intellectual fashion makes feelgood endeavors like outlawing landmines and
other technologies of war the chic pastime for
jet-setting internationalists. Such Nero-like
preoccupations are incongruous in a world
where machetes, knives, and other legacies
of the Bronze Age inflict the worst horrors of
war. These agreements do nothing to deter
societies with insidious intents; for the foreseeable future only powerful forces of good
can do that. Without question, the destruction of civilian property is hardly a cure-all,
but it is another valuable tool for the forces of
the moral against those of the amoral. The
question is, how to implement the new paradigm?
Implementation could come in several ways.
One method would be a revolutionary re-interpretation of "military objective" so as to de-link
the now-required nexus to a contribution to a
specific military action, and to explicitly
include those civilian objects whose loss weakens the nation's collective will to continue the
conflict. A second approach would be to reinvigorate and expand the concept of belligerent
"reprisal." Simply stated, reprisals are acts
otherwise prohibited that become permissible when a belligerent in bello engages in illegal conduct. The victim state (or those acting for it) is allowed to do things usually forbidden in order to end the unlawful acts being
perpetuated upon it. True, to fully achieve
the purpose of coercing societal change, the
classic conception of belligerent reprisal may
need expansion. But a fj.rst step - and one

long overdue - would be to remove the current LOAC limitations that prohibit virtually all reprisals against civilian objects under
just about every circumstance. 33
What may impede the adoption of a new
paradigm is a distorted view of egalitarianism that makes it hard to accept that evil
beliefs could permeate whole peoples. John
Leo wrote that students at some colleges are,
for example, "unwilling to oppose large moral
horrors, including human sacrifice, ethnic
cleansing, and slavery because they think no
one has the right to criticize the moral views of
another group or culture."34 To those similarly
disposed, it is easy to obfuscate issues by asserting complexity after complexity, subtlety after
subtlety, legalism after legalism. But to the
victims of Serb savagery - the Muslim woman
being raped, the child being orphaned by the
murder of his parents, the elderly refugee dying
on a lonely road far from home - adjudging
good and evil is a sadly easy task. We must
not hesitate to demonize the demons.
When societies propagate evil, democracies
must be prepared to visit upon them force so
staggering it will produce fundamental change.
The force needed to do so - whether delivered via traditional kinetic bombing or imposed
by way of a newly developed cyber-technique is not symbolic or incrementally administered,
but rather massive, relentless, and profoundly
shattering. If the widespread destruction of
property serves the purpose of remaking a
society that needs remaking, then international law and ethical norms must yield to
allow it. If fretting about the sanctity of adversaries' bank accounts prevents us from taking action that might help preserve the sanctity of their victims' lives, then our priorities
need re-ordering.

33. See Article 54, 1977 Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed

Conflicts, June 8, 1977.
34. John Leo, ''A No-Fault Holocaust," Us. News & World
Report, July 21, 1997, p. 14.
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